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Abstract 
Many global environmental problems can be understood as collective action dilemmas which 
ultimately requires cooperation in order for them to be resolved. Due to certain stressors 
associated with large-scale collective action for the environment it is unlikely that cooperation 
will occur. However, in large-scale dilemmas, where involved actors typically have no abilities 
to communicate or to sanction defective behaviour, trust has been found to facilitate 
cooperation. But most of these findings stem from research carried out in contexts where 
societal trust is high. Because of substantial variation in trust-levels among countries there is 
reason to question whether the relationship also hold in contexts where societal trust is low. A 
theoretical framework recognizing trust both as a societal feature and an individual trait is 
elaborated in order to test how generalized social trust and political-institutional trust affect 
first- and second-order cooperation. Using survey data from European Values Study, results 
from multilevel analyses show that generalized social trust is positively linked to both first- and 
second-order cooperation, whereas political-institutional trust only is linked to second-order 
cooperation. However, putting trust-context under scrutiny reveals that generalized social trust 
and political-institutional trust are only linked to cooperation in high-trust countries. In low-
trust countries, neither generalized social trust nor political-institutional trust helps to explain 
cooperation for the environment. As such, this thesis sheds some new light upon the role of 
trust in large-scale collective action dilemmas, and deepens our understanding as to how trust 
influence individual propensity to cooperate for the environment. 
 
Keywords: Large-scale environmental collective action, cooperation, social trust, political-
institutional trust, trust-context. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Published in 2018, the ‘Special Report’ by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change stated that in order to limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels the 
world community would have to implement far-reaching transitions in all aspects of society of 
a scale previously unprecedented (IPCC, 2018). Global average temperatures reached one 
degree above pre-industrial levels in 2015 (Hawkins et al., 2017). According to the IPCC report, 
if we are to stay on the pathway of keeping the average global warming below 1.5°C by the 
year of 2100 we have to cut emissions by 45 percent compared to 2010 levels and reach net-
zero emissions by 2050 (2018, p. 12). The growth rate of carbon dioxide emissions has slowed 
down, but the rate is still positive (Peters et al., 2020). Thus, it should be in the world 
community’s deepest interest to radically lower global emissions, yet it is not happening. At 
least not sufficiently enough. 
A common way to understand the inaction in reducing emissions and the mitigation of 
global warming is to frame it as a collective action dilemma (Duit, 2010; Fairbrother, 2016; 
Jagers et al., 2019). A collective action problem is typically described as a situation where the 
benefits for society are highest if all actors cooperate, while any one actor receives a higher 
payoff if they choose not to cooperate (Dawes, 1980). 
In short, collective action problems occur when individuals’ incentives are not in line 
with those of the collective (Sethi, 2010) and can be illustrated by a simple example of a group 
of herdsmen and their sheep, as described by Garrett Hardin in his famous article The Tragedy 
of the Commons (1968). The additional utility given to any one individual herdsman who 
choose to introduce one extra sheep on the pasture land is nearly +1. Apart from the positive 
utility, the extra grazing that comes with the introduction of one additional sheep also entails a 
negative utility of -1. However, the negative utility is shared among all herdsmen. The utility 
net sum are thus positive for any one individual herdsman that chooses to introduce one 
additional sheep on the pasture land. This is where the ‘tragedy’ occurs since incentives facing 
individual herdsmen makes it rational for them to keep introducing extra sheep, a behaviour 
which ultimately will lead to the depletion of grazable land, and the possibilities for the 
collective to continue their activities will therefore cease to exist (Hardin, 1968). 
Early solutions to these types of dilemmas focused on strong institutions intended to alter 
the behaviour among actors. Among them where proposals to alter payoff structures (Dawes, 
1980), imposing coercive measures by external enforcers (Hardin, 1968) and implementing 
selective incentives, rewarding those who cooperate (Olson, 1965). Underpinning these early 
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solutions is the idea that actors’ rational self-interest prevents any attempts at overcoming social 
dilemmas. Self-interest is considered to be such a strong motivator that ‘softer’ social 
mechanisms have little chance restraining it (Dietz et al., 2002, p. 5). In real life, however, it 
does happen that actors overcome their self-interest for the benefit of the collective (Rothstein, 
2001). 
To promote and sustain collective action, research has found that it is beneficial if the 
resource system is small with well-defined boundaries (Agrawal, 2001; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 
1988), that the group set to handle the resource is small, with low degrees of anonymity; that 
actors share norms and expectations on future behaviour as well as a history of successful 
interactions – and of course that they trust each other (Agrawal, 2001; Baland & Platteau, 1996; 
Dietz et al., 2002; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988). However, these findings stems mostly from 
dilemmas of relatively small scale, and many of the threats to our environment originates from 
mass-behaviour on an international level (Duit, 2010). Scaling up, resource systems expand and 
its boundaries cover larger areas, making them harder to manage. Moreover, increasing the 
number of actors involved inevitably makes communication harder and anonymity a problem, 
which increases the risk for free-riding behaviour – a behaviour where actors enjoy the benefits 
from a good without contributing to it (Jagers et al., 2019). 
Hence, overcoming large-scale collective action problems unavoidably requires people 
to cooperate with people whom they know very little about. Unfortunately, sharing the risk of 
an imminent tragedy is not incentive enough in getting individuals to overcome their self-
interest and cooperate. Fear of being exploited by others, thus risking to end up in a situation 
as the ‘sucker’1, make cooperation a risky strategy. In these larger scenarios, trust has also been 
shown to foster cooperation (De Cremer & Stouten, 2003; Hayashi et al., 1999; Parks & 
Hulbert, 1995; Yamagishi & Cook, 1993). However, trust in large-scale dilemmas are of a more 
generalized form compared to the particularized form of trust useful in dilemmas of smaller 
size. Generalized social trust work as a ‘proxy’ for the trustworthiness of others when there are 
no possibilities of obtaining actual information on all actors involved (Sønderskov, 2009). 
The direct and positive relationship between trust and cooperation therefore implies that 
societies steeped with higher levels of generalized trust should display higher levels of 
cooperative behaviour. Yet, recent survey data from European Values Study tells another story. 
In line with theory, in Sweden and Finland where trust-levels are among the world’s highest 
 
1 A situation, or position, where an actor contribute in solving a dilemma but due to widespread free-riding 
behaviour among other actors the good end up being depleted anyway (see Kollock, 1998). 
  6 
(Delhey & Newton, 2005; Holmberg & Rothstein, 2020), about 85 percent of the respondents 
hold the view that they, on an individual level, should do what they can for the environment 
regardless the action taken by others. However, displaying equally high cooperative tendencies 
are countries such as Albania and Hungary, where generalized trust-levels are found at the 
opposite end of the spectrum (EVS, 2019). At first glance, willingness to cooperate for the 
environment seem to be the same in these countries, regardless their levels of trust. The vast 
majority of studies on trust and large-scale collective action in solving environmental problems 
are carried out in contexts where general trust levels are high, both on a societal and on an 
individual level (Jagers & Robertson, 2018). 
The findings that individuals propensity to cooperate for the environment are high even 
in countries where trust is low actualises the question of how trust influence cooperation. 
Although research suggest a strong link between generalized trust and cooperation there is 
reason to yet again ask the question: How do trust influence individuals’ propensity to 
cooperate in large-scale environmental collective action dilemmas? With the further inquiry as 
to how trust-context might alter that relationship, especially motivated since the effect of trust 
have been found to vary greatly between countries (Fairbrother, 2016). If trust are found to only 
influence cooperation in high-trusting countries, the use of trust in large-scale environmental 
dilemmas is rather limited considering that for large parts of the world people do not generally 
trust each other (Fairbrother, 2016). Accordingly, the broader aim of this thesis is to further 
examine the role of trust in overcoming problems related to large-scale collective action. Both 
generalized social trust and political-institutional trust are used to study two types of collective 
action dilemmas – first-, and second order cooperation. Understanding whether trust facilitates 
cooperation regardless the context is useful if we want to tackle many of the environmental 
threats that are requiring cooperation to be resolved. More specifically, the purpose of the study 
is to investigate whether the relationship between trust and cooperation in large-scale 
environmental collective action dilemmas hold using a larger set of countries, and if the 
relationship is independent of trust-context. 
As implied in Jagers and Robertson’s article (2018), the relative effects of individual-
level trust on cooperation might be greater in contexts where societal trust levels are low. On 
the other hand, Irwin and Berigan (2013) found that in collectivist cultures, where societal trust 
is considered low, trust is incapable of bringing cooperation about at all. Whereas in 
individualistic cultures, where societal levels of trust are high, trust is a significant facilitator 
of cooperation (Irwin & Berigan, 2013). By taking trust-context into consideration, there seems 
to be ambiguities both regarding trust’s capacity in promoting cooperation, and the effect of 
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trust in said relationship. Gaining an increased understanding of how the role of trust might 
differ with context are relevant to the research field itself, but also for policy implications 
deriving from it. Policy measures relying on individual trust might result in different outcomes 
dependent upon in which trust-context individuals live. 
After this introductory chapter follows the literature review, which serves the purpose to 
identify a well-motivated research gap. With support from the literature review, a theoretical 
framework is elaborated in chapter three, where a set of hypotheses is formulated as well. Data 
and operationalizations are discussed in chapter four. How to test the hypotheses are discussed 
in chapter five on methodology. Results are presented in chapter six, and discussed and 
analysed in chapter seven. Lastly, the thesis concludes. 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review examines previous research on trust and collective action. First, 
theories explaining how to overcome problems related to collective action are presented. In 
doing so, factors influencing individual propensity to cooperate for the environment is 
identified. Since trust is of main interest in this study a large proportion of the review is devoted 
to the role of trust and how trust is claimed to affect cooperation in environmental collective 
action dilemmas. Trust is a multi-faceted concept and it is necessary to declare as specific as 
possible how the concept are being used. Lastly, a research gap is identified and findings from 
the review are synthesized in order to lay the foundation for the theoretical framework that 
underlies the upcoming analysis. 
 
2.1 Solving the dilemma 
Understanding under which circumstances actors choose to cooperate, and ultimately 
how to resolve problems related to large-scale collective action, is important if we want to solve 
many of the threats facing our environment. To conceptualize the matter Jagers and colleagues 
(2019) developed an analytical framework that sought to bring clarity regarding how factors, 
or facilitators, transition when moving from small- to large-scale collective action. 
Scaling up primarily alters the number of actors involved, the spatial and temporal 
distance, as well as the complexity of the problem (Jagers et al., 2019). In terms of pollution; 
compared to a small lake, an ocean have considerably many more actors contributing to the 
pollution, and it extends over large areas, encompassing many countries. Moreover, it might be 
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hard for any one single actor to directly see the harm that their own polluting activity inflicts as 
well as grasping all possible consequences of their detrimental behaviour. Small scale 
facilitators like being a conditional co-operator that cooperates under the premise that other 
actors also cooperate (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Gächter & Herrmann, 2009) might prove 
insufficient as an explanation in large-scale scenarios as it simply might be impossible to be 
informed on the behaviour of others. Being willing to punish free riders (Gächter & Herrmann, 
2009) and accepting the associated costs of doing so (Fehr & Gächter, 2000) plays little role in 
large-scale scenarios where you typically are unable to identify who the free riders are. 
In fact, due to certain stressors, collective action in large-scale settings are unlikely to 
happen. The increasing number of actors involved causes anonymity, which diminishes 
possibilities for face-to-face communication and the ability to successfully monitor agreements 
and promises between actors, thereby increasing the risk for free-riding behaviour among actors 
(Greif, 1993; Ostrom, 1998). On a related note, inabilities to monitor individuals’ behaviour, in 
combination with their individual contribution being very small, results in difficulties holding 
individual actors accountable (Jagers et al., 2019). With scale, the increased heterogeneity 
among actors involved challenges the possibilities for overcoming social dilemmas and 
sustaining collective action. A variety among actors in terms of identities, socioeconomic 
status, power asymmetries, culture, traditions and religion, undermine the basis for trust, a 
factor considered a necessary prerequisite for cooperation (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 
2010; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). Furthermore, uncertainty about the actions taken by other 
actors when managing a resource have been shown to reduce cooperative behaviour (Rapoport 
et al., 1992). 
Facilitators for cooperation are classified into three categories (Jagers et al., 2019). The 
first set of facilitators are those found on an intra-actor level where actors’ individual 
predispositions determine the likelihood for cooperation. Individuals possessing certain pro-
social preferences, values, and personal norms, are more likely to be concerned about the needs 
and preferences of other actors which thereby improve conditions for cooperation (Bogaert et 
al., 2008; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Kerr, 1995). 
On the inter-actor level, factors such as communication (Balliet, 2010; Dawes et al., 1977; 
Dietz et al., 2002), punishment (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013; Fehr & Gächter, 2000), reciprocity 
(Fischbacher et al., 2001; Ostrom & Walker, 2003) and conditional cooperation (Gächter & 
Herrmann, 2009; Levi, 1998) are found to significantly increase chances for cooperation. Still, 
due to the stressors described above, the relevance of these factors in large-scale dilemmas can 
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be called into question since actors involved in large-scale dilemmas, like recycling, barely 
know about the actions taken by others (Jagers et al., 2019). 
Because of the uncertainty regarding the behaviour of other actors in these types of 
dilemmas, actors have to determine whether to cooperate or not upon their assessments of the 
probable behaviour of other. Trust, however, have proven to be an important mechanism for 
overcoming problems originating from the uncertainty of other people’s behaviour and by 
extension for the resolution of collective action (Cook & State, 2017; Sønderskov, 2009). If 
actors rely on the propensity of other actors to cooperate then cooperation is likely to increase, 
the argument goes (Cook et al., 2005; Cook & State, 2017; Levi & Stoker, 2000; Nannestad, 
2008; Ostrom & Walker, 2003; Uslaner, 2002; Van Lange et al., 2017). Although, it should be 
noted that trust is not the sole driver for cooperation. Cooperation can occur in situations where 
trust is low, or even absent, as is the main argument driven in Cook, Hardin and Levi’s 
Cooperation Without Trust? (2005). At first glance, the role of trust might seem ambiguous 
where it on the one hand facilitates cooperation and on the other seems unnecessary. But as will 
be shown, it is highly dependent upon the conceptualization of trust and how it is defined. 
Finally, facilitators are also prevalent on a societal level. Social norms of cooperation 
affect individual behaviour (Biel & Thøgersen, 2007; Ostrom, 1998; Stern et al., 1999) and 
sound institutions that are able to observe and monitor, as well as sanction defective behaviour, 
increase the likelihood for cooperation among citizens (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Poteete & 
Ostrom, 2004; Tsebelis, 2002; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). Accordingly, trust and social 
norms vary with context (e.g. in different countries), and in terms of state capacity and quality, 
there are crucial variation between as well as within countries (Charron et al., 2015). There are 
therefore reasonable grounds as to why willingness to cooperate should be dependent upon 
factors from both the individual and the contextual level. 
The remainder of this chapter will focus on factors from the three categories in order to 
build an understanding on what shapes cooperation in large-scale environmental collective 
dilemmas. 
 
2.2 Pro-environmental behaviours 
As the term implies, factors found on an intra-actor level has to do with individual 
personality traits facilitating cooperative tendencies, or more generally in this context, pro-
environmental behaviours (PEB). Pro-environmental behaviour is a “behavior that consciously 
seeks to minimize the negative impact of one’s actions on the natural and built world” 
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(Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002, p. 240). Recycling, buying ‘eco-friendly’ products, reducing 
energy usage are voluntary personal efforts that have the possibility of reducing the negative 
impact on the environment. Although more of an indirect approach, paying taxes or donating 
money to environmental charities and funds are also considered actions for reducing one’s 
negative impact. A pro-environmental behaviour is not necessarily equal to cooperation in a 
collective action dilemma, but considering that a lot of research on collective action use PEB’s 
as outcome variables justifies the inclusion of PEB-research in this review. Research on PEB 
aim to understand how individuals can move from having knowledge about threats to the 
environment and an awareness of environmental concerns, into performing benevolent actions 
positive for to the environment (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). 
Research has come up with several ways of making pro-environmental behaviour 
intelligible. Early models suggested that knowledge about the environment would increase 
concern and awareness which would lead to pro-environmental behaviours. Despite its 
simplicity, such models proved insufficient, and information and awareness in isolation seldom 
lead to changes in behaviour (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). However, it served as a starting 
point for further development. 
Presumably the most frequently used method for explaining PEB is Ajzen’s (1991) 
‘theory of planned behaviour’ (TPB) (Yuriev et al., 2020). Compared to earlier models, the 
main contribution of TPB is that it acknowledges that attitudes do not change behaviour 
directly. Attitudes change behaviour indirectly through their ability to influence intentions 
(Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). Intra-level factors such as information, awareness about the 
threats facing the environment, and locus of control shape attitudes and are consequently 
capable of altering intentions to cooperate for the environment. It should be added that 
underlying the formation of attitudes is the evaluative belief of consequences of one’s behaviour 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Holding the position that one’s own actions are inconsequential 
reduces the likelihood for behaving pro-environmentally. 
However, intentions are not solely influenced by attitudes. Individuals’ normative beliefs 
about how other individuals will perceive one’s action, and if the individual want to act in 
accordance with those views, creates a subjective norm that, in addition with the attitude held 
toward the behaviour, influence behavioural intention (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). 
The ambition is not to give a comprehensive account of the literature on pro-
environmental behaviour, but rather to use it as a point of departure for understanding what 
shapes willingness to cooperate, and pro-environmental behaviours more generally. As such, 
the approach taken in this thesis goes in line with the reasoning of Kollmuss and Agyeman 
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(2002) that “see environmental knowledge, values, and attitudes, together with emotional 
involvement as making up a complex we call ‘pro-environmental consciousness’,” which is 
“embedded in broader personal values and shaped by personality traits and other internal as 
well as external factors.” (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002, p. 256). Adopting this approach renders 
the possibility to include factors from the research field on PEB into the theoretical framework 
on environmental cooperation. More specifically, the intra-level factors that will be used are 
awareness about the threats facing the environment and locus of control, political ideology, as 
well as demographic factors. 
 
2.3 The role of trust 
Found on the inter-actor level, trust is generally considered to positively influence the 
outcome of any collaboration and promotes resolutions of social dilemmas (Cook & State, 
2017). However, it should be noted that trust is also considered a societal feature. On a societal 
level trust is considered to be either the direct cause or to be a necessary prerequisite for what 
is generally appreciated in society (Nannestad, 2008). Trust is positively linked to economic 
development and growth (Putnam, 1993; Uslaner, 2002). Trust affect governmental 
performance (Knack, 2002) and the functioning of the welfare state (Rothstein, 2001), and 
societies permeated with trusting people exhibit lower levels of crime and corruption (Rothstein 
& Uslaner, 2005). Regardless all the positive outcomes attributed to the role of trust, there is 
yet to this day no clear-cut theory on trust, and conceptualizations of trust take many forms 
(Delhey & Newton, 2005). In an attempt to disentangle the aspect of interpersonal trust, Peter 
Nannestad reviews the different strands of the concept and identifies two dimensions along 
which interpersonal trust can be classified (Nannestad, 2008). Along the first dimension the 
concept is treated as being either rational or norm-driven. The rational view of the concept goes 
much in line with Cook, Hardin, and Levi’s definition of trust as an ‘encapsulated interest’: “we 
trust you because we think you take our interests to heart and encapsulate our interests in your 
own” (Cook et al., 2005, p. 5). At the other extreme, trust is explained as norm-driven and 
agrees well with Eric Uslaner’s view of trust as “a general outlook on human nature” (Uslaner, 
2002, p. 17) where trust is achieved by socialization processes rather than through rational 
utility maximizing, as in the case of ‘encapsulated interest’. 
Along the second dimension, trust is moving from particularized to generalized. At the 
particularized extreme, trust can only be established between two individuals and tangents the 
approach of trust as ‘encapsulated interest’, where you need to have sufficient information on 
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the other part and that trust only extends to specific situations. At the other end, where trust is 
considered something that can be generalized, it follows that it is fully possible to trust strangers 
you know very little about, and that trust are thought to be useful even in unspecified situations. 
The particularized approach of trust can be expressed with a scenario where actor A trusts actor 
B in a given situation X, whereas the generalized view rather holds that trust is to be thought of 
as a trait that actor A possess, and that other actors, in general, can be trusted, regardless the 
situation (Nannestad, 2008). 
Considering that two widely accepted conceptualizations of trust exist simultaneously 
explains why Putnam (1993) on the one hand and Cook, Hardin, and Levi (2005) on the other 
reaches such stark contrasting conclusions. As developed by Putnam (1993), the social capital 
theory encompasses the generalized definition of trust. Generalized trust, together with other 
virtues such as shared norms of behaviour and participation in formal and informal networks 
make up what is referred to as social capital. Putnam maintains that social capital is crucial for 
explaining the performance of societies and points to the distinct regional differences between 
the relatively well-functioning northern parts of Italy where social capital is prevalent, whereas 
lack of social capital in southern Italy renders dysfunctional societies (Putnam, 1993). Cook, 
Hardin and Levi, with their theory of trust as an ‘encapsulated interest’, withholds that “[t]rust 
is important in many interpersonal contexts, but it cannot carry the weight of making complex 
societies function productively and effectively.” (Cook et al., 2005, p. 1). 
For trust to be a meaningful concept explaining cooperation in large-scale collective 
action settings, it is necessary to apply the broader, generalized, definition of trust. Using a 
narrow definition of trust, one which is only applicable in situations between specific actors 
and with respect to specific issues is simply not useful in situations dealing with global issues 
(e.g. pollution) which by design are characterized by widespread anonymity and poor 
communication opportunities. Cook, Hardin and Levi go so far as to say that “it is impossible 
by our definition to trust strangers and even many of our acquaintances, and it is virtually 
impossible by our definition to trust institutions, governments, or other large collectivities.“ 
(Cook et al., 2005, p. 4-5). Thus, the links between generalized social trust, political-
institutional trust and cooperation that have been identified in previous research should be 
spurious at best. 
However, many researchers argue otherwise. People whom are generally more trustful 
are also more prone to think of other peoples’ intentions in a positive way, causing them to 
establish pro-social behaviours which enables cooperation and in the end the generation of 
positive externalities for society (Stolle, 2001). Regarding the relevance of generalized trust for 
  13 
cooperation in large-scale dilemmas, Rothstein (2005) and Nannestad (2006) argues that the 
scale of the dilemma is of little importance and that the mechanisms at work in small-scale 
scenarios apply in large-scale dilemmas as well. Trusting that most other people cooperate 
reduces the risk for any actor ending up as the sucker if they cooperate, therefore it is safe to 
cooperate, they argue. Sønderskov (2009) questions this, maintaining that it still does not give 
an account as to why actors choose to cooperate if they assume that most people in general 
cooperate, since incentives to free-ride in such contexts should be high. Pointing to evidence 
from evolutionary psychology and experimental economics, Sønderskov (2009) makes an 
assumption that people, in general, are conditional co-operators. That is, an actor cooperate if 
others cooperate. 
But how do these theories fare in practice? Findings from experimental public goods 
games (Fischbacher et al., 2001) show that about a third are free-riders and fifty percent are 
conditional co-operators, giving some support for both views. However, it should be noted that 
contributions are expected to ‘spiral downwards’ over time. Albeit contributions remaining 
positive, when people through repeated interactions learn that other people free-ride they are 
inclined to make smaller contributions (Fischbacher et al., 2001). Conversely, Fairbrother 
(2016), points to a ‘virtuous circle’ where compliance leads to yet higher levels of cooperation 
through self-reinforcing mechanisms of reciprocity, which could help to explain why trust may 
be of relative importance between countries. 
For political-institutional trust to also be a useful concept, it needs to be thought of as a 
generalized form of trust as well. Trust in politicians and institutions reflect institutional quality 
(Duit, 2010; Fairbrother, 2016). If individuals have confidence in and trust that politicians and 
institutions are capable of coercing other individuals into compliance, and in their capabilities 
to properly manage the resource they are set to handle, they are more inclined to comply 
themselves. 
The discussion on trust and cooperation now narrows down to the two specific aspects of 
trust that is relevant for the present study, that is generalized social trust and political-
institutional trust. 
 
2.3.1 Social trust and cooperation 
The literature on social dilemmas generally consider generalized social trust to be 
positively linked to cooperation (Irwin & Berigan, 2013; Sønderskov, 2009). Generalized social 
trust, compared to a more narrow definition, is particularly well suited for dilemmas of large 
scale, since it holds on a theoretical level. The ‘encapsulated trust’ definition do not allow 
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people to trust people in general (Cook et al., 2005), thus rendering it irrelevant in large scale 
dilemmas in which stressors such as anonymity and poor communication are prevalent (Jagers 
et al., 2019). 
Different mechanisms are proposed linking generalized social trust to cooperation. Irwin 
and Berigan (2013) highlights that trusting individuals tend to believe others to have benign 
intentions which thus renders trusting individuals to cooperate since they believe that their 
contribution will be reciprocated. Furthermore, due to trusting individuals’ benevolent outlook 
on others, fear of exploitation will not prevent them from contributing since they expect others 
to contribute as well; contributing is thus perceived as a good investment (Irwin & Berigan, 
2013). Sønderskov argues that generalized social trust works as “a stereotypic perception of 
other people” (2009, p. 147) and tests the hypothesis that “people holding generalized social 
trust are—all else being equal—more inclined to cooperate in large-N collective action 
dilemmas because they expect others to do the same” (Sønderskov, 2009, p. 147) finding that 
the link between trust and cooperation is both positive and robust. 
Through these mechanisms, generalized social trust is found to increase individual 
support for environmental protection and the mitigation of climate change (Fairbrother, 2016; 
Gür, 2020), and their willingness to pay for the environment (Jones et al., 2009); increased 
individual cooperation in both voluntary and regulated collective action situations (Irwin, 
2019). Trusting individuals are also more prone to recycle (Harring et al., 2019). 
 
2.3.2 Political-institutional trust and cooperation 
Many collective action problems take the form of second-order dilemmas. Solving first-
order dilemmas often involves implementing a third-party institution in order to manage the 
good and monitor behaviour (Mansbridge, 2014; Olson, 1965). However, that institution (e.g. 
the UN or a national government), is at the same time also a public good subject to the same 
problems associated with collective action dilemmas since it raises doubts regarding its capacity 
to impartially, and sufficiently enough, coerce and monitor itself (Knack, 2002). For individuals 
to comply with the regulations imposed upon them therefore amounts to whether individuals 
trust their politicians and public institutions. Furthermore, it is not self-evident that social trust 
should be equally important in second-order dilemmas as they are in dilemmas of first order. 
Whereas in some scenarios, like recycling, both aspects of trust are necessary for it to function. 
On a theoretically level, trusting that other people recycle their waste should increase individual 
likelihood for cooperation. Recycling is probably also contingent upon whether individuals 
trust that the institutions set to take care of the garbage disposal in turn actually recycles the 
  15 
waste in a responsible and appropriate way. Confirming this, Harring and colleagues (2019) 
find that both generalized social trust and political-institutional trust are positively linked to 
self-reported recycling behaviour. 
Research suggests that, compared to social trust, the link between political-institutional 
trust on cooperation are somewhat more ambiguous. It is quite reasonable to assume that 
individuals do not necessarily trust all political institutions and all parts of the public sector as 
distrust in one branch often spill over to other areas (Cook et al., 2005, p. 79), and individuals 
might be selective as to which issues they trust political institutions to be capable of managing 
(Harring, 2013). 
Regardless, empirical research has shown that trust in political institutions (e.g. 
politicians, parliament, government) are positively linked to increased support for climate 
policies and environmental protection (Drews & van den Bergh, 2016; Fairbrother, 2016). 
Harring (2013) finds that even after controlling for corruption, which is theoretically closely 
related to the concept of political-institutional trust, people trusting politicians are in general 
more willing to pay for the environment. To nuance the results, Irwin (2009) finds that 
institutional trust only promote cooperation and pro-environmental behaviours in scenarios 
where commitments are relatively cheap and easy. Thus, while political-institutional trust seem 
to increase individuals propensity to engage in activities such as paying for the environment, it 
may do so only up to a certain point. 
Duit (2010), on the other hand, finds inconsistent results from institutional trust on 
cooperation in large-scale environmental collective action. Even though distinguishing between 
coordinated (e.g. contributing to an environmental organisation) and uncoordinated (e.g. 
reducing one’s water consumption) collective action, Duit is unable to find previous 
researchers’ seemingly robust findings of a strong and positive link between institutional trust 
and cooperation. Parts of these findings are probably due to operationalisations. The collective 
action indices, for example, are made up by survey items asking the respondent about whether 
they, for environmental reasons, considered reusing or recycling something instead of throwing 
it away; or if they have ever attended a meeting or signed a petition aimed at protecting the 
environment. Finding that institutional trust (as in confidence in the civil service or the police) 
display a weak relationship with signing petitions should not be surprising since the theoretical 
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2.3.3 Short note on social trust and political-institutional trust 
Explaining the origins of trust or the varying levels of trust between countries (see Delhey 
& Newton, 2005; Nannestad, 2008) is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is appropriate 
to include a short note on the relation between social and political-institutional trust since both 
concepts are included in the theoretical framework. 
Rothstein and Stolle (2008) theorize that institutional quality cause social trust. 
Procedural fairness and impartial institutions lead citizens to be more trusting in the institutions 
that govern them since they can predict the behaviour of officials and judges, etc. This in turn 
influence the way citizens perceive their own safety and protection. By experiencing that other 
people also act under the same conditions and are being treated equally creates breeding 
grounds for social trust to evolve (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008). 
A Danish study addressed this issue and disentangled the question regarding causality 
between social and political-institutional trust and asked whether social trust cause political-
institutional trust or vice versa, or whether both forms of trust rather reflects some deep-rooted 
disposition. By measuring the same participants for as long as 18 years, results from panel 
analyses led them to strongly affirm that political-institutional trust cause social trust 
(Sønderskov & Dinesen, 2016). Denmark are among the top performers in terms of both social 
and political-institutional trust, and it is therefore not necessarily the case that these results hold 
in contexts where trust is low. Other findings also suggest that individuals with high levels of 
social trust moving to countries where institutional quality is low retain their high levels of 
social trust, indicating that institutional quality does not cause already trusting individuals into 
being less trusting (Bergh & Öhrvall, 2018). 
 
2.4 Trust-context 
The ending section of this literature review discusses how the societal level, or context, 
might affect willingness to cooperate. On a societal level, generalized trust levels show great 
variation where some measures show that for some countries about 70 percent state that people 
in general can be trusted whereas for some countries the same number is down to almost 0 
percent (Nannestad, 2008). Research suggests that societal trust levels are partly explained by 
race, age and education (Irwin & Berigan, 2013), where high trust countries often have in 
common that they are ethnically and linguistically homogeneous, Protestant, rich and with low 
income inequality and high quality of government (Delhey & Newton, 2005). 
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Social norms and cultural traditions also influence cooperation. Since norms and 
traditions varies at country level and are generally reflecting those held by the dominant culture 
(Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002), it is probable that some countries will have rather strong norms 
of cooperation whereas others will not. Regardless individual levels of trust, if there are no 
societal norms of cooperation, chances are that it will affect their willingness to cooperate 
negatively. This reasoning taps into the thinking of Elinor Ostrom, as summarized in Jagers and 
colleagues (2019): links between trust, reciprocity and reputation form the basis for cooperation 
in collective action dilemmas. Reciprocity norms are more prevalent in countries where citizens 
are used to cooperate, leading to a desire among individuals to be perceived as trustworthy. Due 
to the interconnectedness between these factors they can be understood as being part of a 
virtuous circle (Fairbrother, 2016; Jagers et al., 2019) where they help to mutually reinforce 
each other. The same mechanisms can of course explain the opposite outcome as well. If actors, 
based on previous experiences, do not expect that other actors will cooperate, they might choose 
to abstain from cooperation (Jagers et al., 2019). Previous studies have failed to adequately 
account for the impact that context might have on the trust-cooperation relationship. 
Hence, does it matter for cooperation whether you live in a high-trusting or low-trusting 
country? Actualized by findings showing that the effect of trust on predicting support for 
environmental protection varies greatly between countries (Fairbrother, 2016) there is reason 
to investigate whether this applies to the relationship between trust and environmental 
cooperation in general as well. Especially since many studies that found trust to be a significant 
explanation to cooperation are carried out in contexts where trust is high (Irwin & Berigan, 
2013; Jagers & Robertson, 2018). 
Does the relationship hold in contexts where distrust is widespread among its citizens? 
The rationale is that in order for cooperation and compliance with rules to occur, individuals 
have to trust that other individuals, as well as politicians and authorities, also comply 
(Fairbrother, 2016). Perhaps somewhat exaggerated, if people do not trust that other actors will 
comply it is unlikely that they themselves will choose to play by the rules and cooperate, at 
least when compared to a context where the majority consider other people trustworthy. An 
article tested this hypothesis and concluded that for recycling and consumption of organic food, 
it holds; in countries where generalized social trust is higher the amount of recycling and 
organic food consumption is comparatively higher (Sønderskov, 2009). 
Perhaps the most well-reputed theory of trust and context is that of Toshio Yamagishi 
(Yamagishi, 2017; Yamagishi et al., 1998; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). In short, the theory 
asserts that collectivist societies have strong bonds between in-group members, fostering self-
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monitoring and in-group sanctioning. Thus, for collectivist societies, in-group trust is high 
while trust on a societal level is low. Whereas in individualistic societies people do not have 
the same type of group affiliations and out of necessity their trust radius are wider since they 
have to trust its co-citizens more generally in order to cooperate. Similar to the present study, 
Irwin and Berigan (2013) tests whether these cultural differences affects the relationship 
between trust and willingness to engage in cooperation for the environment. They hypothesize 
that trust is an insufficient explanation for cooperation in collectivist societies, while in high-
trusting individualistic societies trust is a strong predictor for cooperation. They distinguish 
between two aspects of cooperation through two items: how willing individuals are to i) cut 
living standards, and ii) pay much higher taxes, in order to protect the environment. By gaining 
support for their hypotheses, their results indicate an interplay between culture and trust in 
predicting cooperation. 
 
2.5 Aim of the study 
The effect of trust on cooperation in large-scale collective action dilemmas needs to be 
further investigated. If we are to improve chances for solving many of our most pressing threats 
facing the environment it is necessary to understand how cooperation best can be facilitated. 
Since societal levels of trust differ substantially across countries there is reason to believe that 
the relationship between individual-level social trust, political-institutional trust, and 
cooperation, might differ between countries. The lion’s share of previous research have studied 
the link mostly in contexts where trust on a societal level is high (Jagers & Robertson, 2018). 
Even though Irwin and Berigan (2013) tried to bring in context as a mediator, they were mostly 
interested in differences between collectivistic and individualistic societies and did so by 
looking specifically at the US. Even if trust varies across states in the US, they are all subset to 
the same federal laws and institutions. To better understand the role of trust in fostering 
cooperation in large-scale environmental collective action dilemmas, ultimately spanning the 
whole globe, there is a need to better understand how individual-level trust affects cooperation 
for the environment using a wider set of countries that, in terms of trust, varies more. 
Furthermore, most literature measure collective action through different pro-
environmental behaviours, like recycling and membership in environmental groups (Irwin, 
2019). While they most certainly are collective action dilemmas, it is not necessarily the case 
that respondents’ perceive them as such. Using items that better touches upon the very logic of 
collective action dilemmas should pave the way for a deeper understanding of how trust 
influence cooperation in large-scale collective action dilemmas. As such, the present study is 
  19 
an empirical contribution to the ongoing research on how factors proven benevolent in small-
scale collective action dilemmas travel to large-scale dilemmas. 
 
 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In the previous literature review it was concluded that factors influencing individuals 
propensities to cooperate in solving large-scale environmental collective action dilemmas are 
situated at three different levels. It is necessary to include these factors in order to better isolate 
the unique effect that trust has on cooperation. Intra-level factors are found “within” 
individuals; it is what constitute individuals in terms of personality traits, environmental 
attitudes, and demographic factors. Of special interest for this study is the role of trust. Trust is 
found at the inter-actor level: between individuals, as well as between individuals and 
institutions. Furthermore, considering the large variation of trust on the societal level there is 
reason to believe that the choice individuals make to cooperate to some extent will be influenced 
by the context in which they are nested. 
Following the rationale of Irwin and Berigan (2013) and Irwin (2019), I distinguish 
between first-order and second-order cooperation. First-order cooperation refers to 
contributions aimed directly to the collective effort, for example reducing one’s carbon 
footprint by riding the bike instead of taking the car, or turning down the thermostat. Second-
order cooperation is an indirect way of contributing and refers to situations where there are 
intermediaries between the contributing individual and the actual collective effort. The need for 
an intermediary, typically the state, arise because individuals often are incapable of 
satisfactorily reaching the desired outcome on their own. For individuals to take part in second-
order cooperation often necessitates that they trust the institutions set to handle the task (Jagers 
& Robertson, 2018). Paying environmental taxes involves a paying individual, but also an 
institution responsible for collecting the tax and turning it into a joint environmental action. Or, 
as discussed, if individuals do not trust the institutions taking care of waste management to 
function properly they will probably be less inclined to recycle. In these types of scenarios 
social trust may not be the only relevant aspect of trust. It is therefore necessary to distinguish 
between on the one hand social trust and on the other political-institutional trust when 
examining second-order cooperation. 
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3.1 Relationship between trust and cooperation 
For first-order cooperation to occur in large-scale environmental collective action 
dilemmas individuals have to act without knowing how other individuals will act. Due to 
inherent risks of free-riding behaviour in large scale dilemmas there is reason to believe that 
other people might put their own self-interest before the interest of the collective. Individuals 
may want to contribute to protect the environment but are hampered by the fact that they cannot 
do it themselves, concluding that the desired outcome only is reached through joint efforts 
(Connelly et al., 2012, p. 143-4). As discussed, in large-scale collective action dilemmas, 
generalized social trust can help to promote cooperation when individuals have no possibilities 
of monitoring the behaviour of others (Gür, 2020; Irwin & Berigan, 2013; Nannestad, 2008; 
Sønderskov, 2009), and explain why cooperation occur even in the absence of third-party 
enforcement. Therefore, all else equal, in countries where citizens generally trust each other, 
cooperation should be more common compared to countries where distrust is widespread 
among its citizens. 
Hypothesis 1 states that individuals believing in the trustworthiness of others are more 
inclined to join in on any first-order cooperation since they trust that others will do the same. 
Through expected reciprocity, the risks involved with joining in on any first-order cooperation 
will be perceived as lower. For second-order cooperation there is reason to believe that 
individuals who generally trust other people might hold the opinion that second-order solutions 
are unnecessary since they are inclined to cooperate anyways, and expect others to do so as 
well. Because of the expected reciprocity among trusting individuals, hypothesis 2 states that 
generalized social trust will exhibit a positive relationship even in second-order cooperation. 
After all, if people trust that other people pay their taxes – a second-order situation – it will be 
more meaningful for themselves to do so as well. 
As discussed, analysing second-order cooperation requires the concepts of social trust 
and political-institutional trust to be distinguished. While social trust is still relevant, it is also 
necessary for individuals to have confidence in the political-institutional system, whose task it 
is to manage each individual’s contribution. Without such confidence individuals are less 
inclined to cooperate. It is simply no idea to contribute if you believe that the institutions 
implemented are incapable of efficiently reaching the intended purpose or that they are unable 
to enforce other individuals into cooperation. Therefore, hypothesis 3 states that the more 
individuals trust the political-institutional system, the more they are inclined to join in on 
second-order cooperation. 
  21 
The link between political-institutional trust and first-order cooperation is not 
straightforward. At first glance it may seem farfetched that political-institutional trust should 
have an impact on individuals’ propensity to enter into first-order cooperation. However, 
considering the discussion regarding causality between political-institutional and social trust it 
is probable that political-institutional trust is an antecedent factor affecting individuals’ social 
trust levels. In that way, it is possible that political-institutional trust has an effect on first-order 
cooperation, but through its impact that it has on social trust. By putting the causality debate 
aside, and for the sake of this framework, hypothesis 4 states that political-institutional trust 
has no correlation with first-order cooperation. 
 
Figure 3.1. Hypothesized relationship between trust-context, generalized social trust, 











3.2 Exploring the role of trust-context 
Due to the varying levels of trust between countries (Fairbrother, 2016; Nannestad, 2008) 
and the fact that most studies on trust are carried out in high-trust countries, this thesis is also 
set to explore whether trust-context affect the relationship between trust and cooperation. To 
understand this requires the concept of trust to be broadened. According to scholars like Putnam 
(1993), social trust can be understood as being a part of the wider concept of social capital and 
should be thought of as a societal feature rather than a personality trait, where societies rich in 
social capital enjoy higher levels of cooperation compared to societies where social capital is 
low. On the other hand, trust is a personality trait, or a characteristic that individuals have – 
some individuals trust other people in general whereas others do not. Thus, the combination of 
trust as a societal feature and trust on an individual level opens up for the possibility that the 
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agreed upon that in order for trust to have its benevolent effect on cooperation, individuals have 
to trust other individuals to quite a large extent (Ostrom, 2010). Although only an exploration, 
the prediction is that in countries where societal trust levels are low, individual levels of trust 
might only marginally increase individuals’ propensity to cooperate for the environment, if at 
all. 
 
3.3 Towards a more comprehensive model 
Even though trust is of principal interest, trust only accounts for marginal explanations to 
cooperation. People may choose to cooperate for the environment out of entirely different 
reasons than those discussed in this theoretical framework (e.g. out of altruism, to feel better 
about oneself). The ambition is not to give a full account on what creates individuals’ 
cooperative predispositions. Still, it is necessary to expand the framework to better be able to 
isolate the unique effect that trust has on cooperation. 
If people are aware of the seriousness of the threats facing the environment, and if they 
think that it is within their capacity to do something about it, are important to consider in a 
model explaining cooperation. Demographic factors such as age, sex, income, and education; 
as well as state capacity and economic development on a societal level, also help to explain 
parts of the cooperative tendencies found within people and are thus embodied into the 
framework. How these factors are hypothesized to influence cooperation are covered under the 
following chapter on operationalizations. 
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4. DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATIONS 
4.1 Data 
Individual level data are collected from the fifth wave of the European Values Study 
(EVS). EVS has conducted surveys through 1981 to 2017 with the focus of covering 
individuals’ attitudes, beliefs, and values concerning a variety of topics, where the environment 
is one among them (EVS, 2019). The recommended fieldwork period for the fifth wave were 
between September 2017 and December 2017, although several countries submitted their 
responses as late as late summer 2018. The data cover 30 European countries and compared to 
other datasets it includes a relatively large share of the Eastern European countries2. Interviews 
were carried out in each country in their native languages using either a traditional paper and 
pen method (PAPI) or computer assisted techniques (CAPI). Despite large variances in 
response rate among countries (from 25 to 87 percent), the survey includes 56,368 respondents 
selected through random sampling, resulting in an average of 1879 respondents per country 
(EVS, 2019)3. 
Data on the country level variable of economic development are gathered from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators4 provided in the QoG Standard Dataset 20205. Data on 
state capacity is also collected from the QoG dataset. Data on trust-context are country averages 
of individuals’ social trust scores and are thus based on aggregates of the individual data found 
in the EVS dataset. 
 
4.2 Operationalizations 
4.2.1 Dependent variables 
In order to operationalize the two aspects of collective action dilemmas, two items are 
used as dependent variables. The EVS-survey asks respondents on a five-level Likert scale how 
much they agree or disagree with a set of environmental statements, where 1 is ‘agree strongly’, 
2 ‘agree’, 3 ‘neither agree nor disagree’, 4 ‘disagree’, and 5 ‘disagree strongly’. 
The concept of first-order cooperation is covered through the item: “[t]here is no point in 
doing what I can for the environment unless others do the same.” The second item is intended 
 
2 See Appendix A for a full list of participating countries. 
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to capture second-order cooperation, and is stated as: “I would give part of my income if I were 
certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental pollution.” 
What separates the two is that the first one taps into respondents’ general attitudes toward 
cooperating to save the environment. The respondents are thus free to interpret it as any pro-
environmental behaviour, but the point is that it is contingent upon their assessment of other 
individuals’ behaviour. Following the rationale of this thesis, if individuals believe people in 
general to be trustworthy, they will also have a more positive outlook on the likelihood that 
others will cooperate, thus, they themselves will be more inclined to do what they can as well. 
That is, they disagree to the statement to a greater extent. 
The second item differ in that it measure respondents’ willingness to indirectly contribute 
to the cause by paying institutions whose function is to protect the environment. The likelihood 
for any one individual to cooperate is to some extent dependent upon their trust in others 
propensity to contribute, as well as in the institutions set to take care of the contributions. The 
second-order item is reversed so that higher values indicate a higher willingness to pay for the 
environment. 
Both items taps into the logic of collective action dilemmas since respondents ought to 
know that their own contributions are infinitesimal, and that in order to achieve a noticeable 
outcome they are dependent upon mass-contributions by other people. 
 
4.2.2 Independent variables 
In line with previous research, generalized social trust is measured with a survey item 
asking respondents: “generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” where respondents are given the response 
categories “most people can be trusted” and “cannot be too careful”. That the measurement is 
dichotomous is unfortunately a drawback since it prevents distinctions being made between e.g. 
high and moderate trusting people. Thus, respondents are either trusting other people in general, 
or they do not. While an ordinal measurement might be preferable, which would enable 
distinctions between trusting peoples to be made, it is not straightforward what it would actually 
mean if individuals describe themselves as a ‘7’ or an ‘8’ since substantial differences across 
the scale are not uniform. Especially not when considering the criticism directed at the 
measurement itself. 
According to Nannestad the greatest weakness of the item is that it is subject to 
respondents’ own interpretations, which could lead to implications in terms of validity. If 
respondents interpret wording differently it jeopardizes comparisons across individuals, 
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countries and time (Nannestad, 2008). As an example, Cook, Hardin and Levi mention that the 
words “most people” might have a different meaning today compared to what it had 40 or 50 
years ago. Today, larger shares of the population lives in urban areas, and due to increased 
immigration, “most people” refers to both larger and more diverse groups of people, they argue 
(Cook et al., 2005, p. 14). Another view is given by Uslaner who argues that it rather reflects 
respondents moral compasses and their outlooks on life in general (Uslaner, 2002). 
In total, using a dichotomous variable might be a way to avoid much of the conceptual 
criticism since it at least enables distinctions to be made between trusting and non-trusting 
individuals, regardless their interpretation. Finally, this thesis is a contribution to the ongoing 
empirical research on trust and collective action, and as such, it is justified to facilitate 
comparisons by using similar measurements. 
Following “standard operating procedure” (see for example Duit, 2010; Harring, 2013; 
Jagers & Robertson, 2018; Sønderskov & Dinesen, 2016; Turper & Aarts, 2017), political-
institutional trust is measured through an index. The index consists of six items asking the 
respondents about their confidence in i) the parliament, ii) the government, iii) the political 
parties, iv) the civil service, v) the justice system, and vi) the police. Response options ranges 
from one, “a great deal”, to four, “none at all”, and are reversed so that higher values indicate 
more trust in the political-institutional system. 
Often political trust and institutional trust are kept as two separate concepts where 
research in the US tend to focus on trust in political institutions, most often the government. 
Research done outside the US usually applies a broader perspective, including both 
legislative/executive branches and parts of the public sector (Sønderskov & Dinesen, 2016).  
Research suggests that trust in representative institutions (e.g. parliament and 
government) form a one-dimensional construct (Turper & Aarts, 2017). Including additional 
measures of both political and institutional trust into the same index might therefore lead to 
questions regarding validity. A principal-component factor analysis was run to test the 
consistency of the items. In fact, the only factor identified with an eigenvalue over 1 included 
all six items. With an eigenvalue of 3.48 and explaining 58 percent of the variance, the six items 
combined clearly measures the same underlying dimension. Testing the internal consistency of 
the measure, a test of Cronbach’s alpha revealed a coefficient of 0.85, thus surpassing the 
recommended lower threshold of 0.7 (Mehmetoglu, 2017, p. 282). Furthermore, from a 
theoretical standpoint the dependent variables used in this study allow for a more general 
interpretation of political and institutional trust to be used since they are not directly concerning 
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any specific parts of the political sphere or the public sector. Rather, the aim is to capture 
individuals’ general trust in the political-institutional system as a whole. 
As discussed, trust-context is operationalized by aggregating trust-scores for each 
country. The lowest score are found in Albania, where 2.5 percent of the population hold the 
view that people in general can be trusted, at the other end is Denmark where 77.4 percent trust 
people in general. 
 
4.2.3 Control variables 
Stemming from pro-environmental behaviour research, awareness and locus of control 
are included to account for intra-level determinants. Being aware of the threats facing our 
environment should potentially lead to a greater willingness among individuals to work together 
to mitigate the threats (Fairbrother, 2016). Accordingly, if individuals perceive that the threats 
are not serious enough, why should they be willing to make sacrifices to take action against it? 
Furthermore, if individuals believe that it is beyond their personal capacity to do anything to 
mitigate environmental degradation, that it is up to someone else to do it, they should also be 
less inclined to enter into any cooperation. 
Awareness is measured through an EVS-item asking the respondent on a five-level scale 
how much they agree or disagree with the statement “many of the claims about environmental 
threats are exaggerated”. The more individuals are disagreeing to the statement the more 
“aware” they are of the threats facing our environment. Using the same scale, locus of control 
are captured with the statement “it is just too difficult for someone like me to do much about 
the environment”. The hypothesized relationship is negative, meaning that the more individuals 
agree to the statement the lower their willingness to cooperate for the environment. Both 
awareness and locus of control are treated as continuous variables. 
It is often assumed that political ideology is correlated with environmental attitudes and 
that people to the left tend show stronger pro-environmental attitudes (Fairbrother, 2016). 
While it may be true for some countries, results show that it is a left-right issue in some 
countries while the opposite holds in other countries (Fairbrother, 2016; Pisano & Lubell, 
2017). Among suggested explanations is that the previous strong relationship between political 
ideology and environmental attitudes primarily are driven by findings from contexts 
characterized with great political divides on environmental issues (like the US), and that 
findings show the strong association between parties left-of-centre and environmental issues to 
be true only in Anglo-Saxon countries (Fairbrother, 2016). Considering the country sample 
studied (i.e. large share of non-Anglo-Saxon countries) it is expected that political ideology 
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might exhibit mixed results. Political ideology is measured through respondents’ self-
placement along a 10-point left-right scale, where one is ‘left’ and ten is ‘right’. 
State capacity is included as a second-level variable in the analyses because of its 
theoretical links to trust (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008). It is measured with the PRS Group’s ICRG 
index, consisting of three components: corruption, law and order; and bureaucracy. The index, 
collected from the QoG Standard Dataset 2020 (Teorell et al., 2020), ranges from 0 to 1 where 
low scores indicate inefficient and corrupt institutions, whereas high scores indicates an 
impartial and well-functioning state apparatus. It is often argued that corruption diminishes 
prospects for cooperation (Harring, 2013) and that well-functioning states “enhances the sense 
of security, promotes cooperation, and evokes a willingness to take risks even among strangers 
or relative strangers.” (Cook et al., 2005, p. 155). State capacity should therefore be positively 
linked to both first- and second-order cooperation. 
Economic development is commonly linked to pro-environmental behaviours through 
two theories: Inglehart’s theory on post-material values and the affluence hypothesis (Harring, 
2013). Inglehart posited that the generations growing up in the relatively secure and rich 
societies emerging after World War II could afford to prioritize other values than what the pre-
war generations could (Inglehart, 1977), implying that individuals and societies with such post-
materialistic values are more prone to protect the environment. Somewhat similar to the post-
material hypothesis, the affluence hypothesis states that environmental protection is a good that 
becomes increasingly demanded as individuals and societies get richer (Harring, 2013). That 
is, richer countries, as well as relatively more affluent individuals within countries, will demand 
more environmental protection and are thus more willing to cooperate for the environment. 
Included in the analyses are both country-level economic development and household 
income. Economic development are measured with country-level GDP/Capita and for the sake 
of causality it is recommended that country-level variables are from time-points prior to the 
survey’s fieldwork period (Mehmetoglu, 2017, p. 206). GDP/Capita (constant 2010 US-dollar) 
data are thus from the period 2014-2016 as found in the QoG Standard Dataset 2020 (Teorell 
et al., 2020). The variable is divided by 1000 in order to obtain more apprehensible coefficients, 
as well as log-transformed to make it better align with a normal distribution. Household income 
are based on respondents’ self-reported annual income which then determined their relative 
placement in the income distribution. The scale is from 1-10 meaning that a respondent with a 
score of  “1” corresponds to the 1st decile of the income distribution, and so on. Unfortunately, 
the variable does not account for household size meaning that it potentially could lead to bias 
where single households systematically are classified as poorer than households with two, or 
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more, family members. On the other hand, larger households have greater expenses, eventually 
offsetting some bias. All in all, it is expected that households belonging to higher income 
categories will be more inclined to cooperate since they have, in material terms, more resources. 
Other demographic factors included are education, age and sex. Education are linked both 
to higher levels of generalized trust (Frederiksen et al., 2016) and a higher propensity to engage 
in pro-environmental behaviours (Hines et al., 1987). Age and sex are also found to be linked 
to pro-environmental behaviours. Young females are more likely to engage in pro-
environmental behaviours compared to older males, although the relationship is weak and 
sometimes insignificant (Hines et al., 1987). Education are coded into four categories where 
“0” indicates a highest educational level of primary school, “1” secondary school and non-
tertiary post-secondary, “2” university and “3” doctoral level or above, and are referred to as 
low, medium-low, medium-high, and high. Age is categorized into three intervals: 15-29, 30-
49, and 50 or above. Sex is a dummy where “1” indicates the respondent being female. 
 
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
First-order cooperation 3.38 1.21 1 5 
Second-order cooperation 3.35 1.17 1 5 
Social trust 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Political-institutional trust 2.36 0.62 1 4 
Awareness 3.44 1.14 1 5 
Locus of control 3.23 1.17 1 5 
Political ideology 5.43 2.27 1 10 
State capacity 0.72 0.21 0.333 0.972 
GDP/Capita (log) 3.14 0.94 1.37 4.51 
Household income 5.07 2.75 1 10 
Education 1.23 0.55 0 3 
Age 2.34 0.74 1 3 




Even though the ambition is to generalize findings to as many contexts as possible the 
ability to do so is curtailed by the fact that the items used for operationalizing the dependent 
variables only exists for European countries. To the author’s knowledge there is no other dataset 
that equally satisfactorily capture individuals’ willingness to cooperate for the environment in 
large-scale collective action problems. Although the 30 countries covered in this study show 
great variation in terms of trust levels, economic development and institutional quality it is still 
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a rather homogeneous sample compared to the rest of the world. However, a large share of the 
countries are EU members which could result in a set of shared norms and values among 
member states. In the same way, many of the eastern countries share a history of Soviet rule 
and communism which might lead individuals in those countries to have a different relation to 
and experience with political institutions than their western counterparts. Thus, in this to some 
extent homogeneous sample there still exists a large variance with respect to factors influencing 
trust levels (Delhey & Newton, 2003) and is therefore well suited for an analysis of trust-
context. 
The dependent variables are measuring respondents’ cooperative intentions rather than 
actual behaviour. Pro-environmental behaviour theory ultimately is about understanding actual 
behaviour, and intentions only partially explain behaviour. Unfortunately, this is a common 
feature of survey based research on pro-environmental behaviours. In a review-article on pro-
environmental behaviour studies it was shown that a third of the articles examine intention 
rather than behaviour, and that only a tenth of those are transparent about it (Yuriev et al., 2020). 
However, measuring intention rather than behaviour should to some extent mitigate bias 
stemming from the ‘social desirability’ that otherwise is associated with respondents’ self-
reported behaviour (Krumpal, 2013). Furthermore, items intended to measure actual behaviour 
(e.g. recycling) typically do not cover any reasoning behind the behaviour which would render 
them inadequate for this thesis’ framework. 
As for causality, associated with the use of cross-sectional data is that it is impossible to 
disentangle any questions regarding cause and effect since data only represents a single point 
in time. Even if it is implausible from a theoretical standpoint that the dependent variables 
would cause social and political-institutional trust, due to the nature of the data, it cannot be 
ruled out for certain. One can, however, use data from an earlier point in time, as was done with 




The examination of the relationship between trust and cooperation is well suited for 
regression analysis. However, the respondents in the data are clustered in different countries 
and to account for the dependency among observations that this entails, multilevel models are 
appropriate. Assuming observations to be independent when they in fact are not might lead to 
standard errors being too small and type I errors, in which a true null hypothesis is falsely 
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rejected. Multilevel models also enable for the analysis of how a variable’s effect varies across 
countries by calculating variance components both from within and between groups. 
Furthermore, state capacity and GDP/Capita are second-level variables that do not vary within 
countries. Mixing first-level variables and second-level variables necessitates multilevel 
models. 
The dependent variables are measured on an ordinal scale, but it is often considered that 
if an ordinal variable has at least five response categories it can be treated as approximately 
continuous without risking any serious estimation bias (Hox, 2010). Especially so if the 
underlying concept to be measured also is of a continuous nature. Treating the variables as 
continuous instead of ordinal has the advantages of being both easier to interpret and more 
intuitive to understand compared to the logistic estimations that is otherwise needed. Multilevel 
mixed-effects linear regression models are appropriate for continuous outcome variables 
(Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017). 
However, to justify the use of multilevel models the intraclass correlation coefficient 
(ICC) are calculated. By dividing the between-group variance in the dependent variables by the 
sum of between- and within-group variance it is estimated how much of the variation that can 
be attributed to the second level. If no between-group variance exists there is no need to do 
multilevel analysis since all variance is explained at the lower level. It is suggested that if the 
ICC is above 5 percent, multilevel models are warranted (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017, p. 
203). For first-order cooperation the ICC is 8.7 percent and 9.2 percent for second-order 
cooperation, indicating that about 9 percent are explained by country-level factors and the data 
is therefore suitable for multilevel analysis. 
The strength of a multi-level model is that it explains variance in the cooperation variables 
stemming from both individual and contextual factors. Of interest in this thesis is the possibility 
that trust-context might alter the individual-level trust-cooperation link. Allowing trust 
coefficients to vary between countries (random slopes) enables such inquiries (Mehmetoglu, 
2017, p. 210). Apart from being theoretically motivated, it is also recommended that random 
slope models should significantly improve model fit. Likelihood-ratio-tests were run to 
compare fixed-effects to random-slope models. All tests were significant at the .001 level and 
random-slope models are therefore an appropriate way to investigate the data. 
Two types of analyses are run. First, the relationship between trust, first-, and second-
order cooperation are investigated using the whole sample. These analyses provides the basis 
for the hypothesis testing. Secondly, trust-context are explored by analysing two subsamples – 
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the five most and least trusting countries – to see whether the role of trust in facilitating 
cooperation is insensitive to context. 
 
5.1 Diagnostics 
In order to obtain correct estimates from multilevel regression analysis certain 
assumptions must be met. As discussed, ordinal variables with at least five categories are treated 
as continuous, including the dependent variables. Therefore many of the assumptions for 
standard OLS can be applied to the multilevel framework. By treating ordinal variables as 
continuous the assumption of linearity is met, and a one unit increase in any of the continuous 
variables therefore corresponds to a constant change in the outcome variable (Mehmetoglu & 
Jakobsen, 2017, p. 137). 
Whether there are multi-collinearity in the models are checked by calculating the variance 
inflation factors. VIF-values exceeding the value of five may indicate that there is a problem 
with multicollinearity (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017, p. 147). Even after accounting for 
correlation within clusters it unfortunately turns out that both GDP/Capita and state capacity 
have values over seven. Although not measuring the same underlying phenomena the 
correlation between the two variables are far too high (r=.93, p<.01) to warrant the inclusion of 
both. GDP/Capita is therefore excluded from the analyses since it is more theoretically 
motivated to include a measure of state capacity6. This is generally a problem when doing 
multilevel models with relatively few second-level observations and concepts that correlate to 
a large extent. Without GDP/Capita included in the models the VIF-values ranges from 1.02 to 
1.29 and it is concluded that multicollinearity no longer exists in the models7. 
A Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity is run on each model. Results indicate that 
the error terms might suffer from heteroskedasticity, meaning that there is risk for inflicting 
bias when estimating standard errors. But it should be noted that multilevel models typically 
accounts for dependency among error terms since the very idea of such models is to deal with 
clustered observations. Moreover, the influence of a categorical variable on the outcome 
variable naturally varies across their constituting components, i.e. the influence of the low-
educated category compared to the high-educated category on an outcome variable may differ 
both in terms of effect size and significance levels, even though they are parts of the same 
 
6 As a test of robustness, full models were tested with GDP/Capita, resulting in no substantial differences for the 
hypothesis testing, see Appendix C: table C3. 
7 See Appendix B: table B1. 
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variable, and thus generating heteroskedasticity. Regardless, it should be kept in mind that this 
is a potential flaw in the models and it is therefore recommended that extra attention are given 
to the estimated standard errors and significance levels of the predictors. 
As for the assumption of normally distributed errors, examinations of residuals as well as 
predicted values reveal that they are approximately normally distributed, except for some 
skewness to the left for the first-order cooperation model8. 
To make sure that no observations exerts unproportionally large influence on the outcome 
in the models, Cook’s distance statistics are estimated. The analysis shows that no observations 
come nowhere near the cut-off value of 1 as the highest value in the first-order cooperation 
model is about 0.0025 and 0.0017 in the second-order model9. This is expected since it would 
be highly unlikely for a single observation among almost 32,000 observations to have 
disproportionate impact on the outcome. 
 
5.2 Robustness tests 
Since dependent variables are treated as continuous even though they are ordinal, the first 
test of robustness is to test whether the same results are obtained by running the full models in 
multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic regressions. Results from the ordered logistic 
regressions tells the same story as the linear models and it is therefore concluded that linear 
models are justified. See Appendix C, table C1 for full results. 
Using a dichotomous operationalization of the key concept of social trust might be 
considered a flaw, especially if there is an ambition to distinguish between individuals’ different 
levels of generalized social trust. To compensate for this potential weakness, a social trust index 
is used. The index is made up of four items asking the respondent on a scale from 1-4 how 
much they trust people from various groups, where 1 is “trust completely”, 2 “trust somewhat”, 
3 “do not trust very much”, and 4 “do not trust at all”. Groups included are: people i) in their 
neighbourhoods, ii) they meet for the first time, iii) of another religion, and iv) of another 
nationality. As such, the index is slightly more ‘particularistic’ than the conventional 
measurement of generalized trust (Sønderskov, 2009) and may therefore not entirely agree with 
generalized social trust theory, but as a proxy for ‘people in general’, and as a robustness test it 
should suffice. With an eigenvalue from a factor analysis showing 2.6 and a test of Cronbach’s 
alpha resulting in 0.817, the index satisfactorily meets the requirements in terms of validity and 
 
8 See Appendix B: figures B1-B6. 
9 See Appendix B: figures B7-B8. 
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reliability. The items are reversed so that higher scores corresponds to having more trust in 
other people. Except for minor changes regarding the effect size and significance levels of sex 
and age, the only substantial difference is that social trust operationalized with an index has a 





In this chapter results from the two different sets of analyses are presented: a) the 
relationship between trust, first-, and second-order cooperation, and b) the explorative 
investigation of trust-context. 
 
6.1 Relationship between trust, first- and second-order cooperation 
Results from the multilevel regressions showing the relationship between trust and first-
order cooperation are found in table 6.1 and for second-order cooperation in table 6.2. In model 
1 and 2 social trust and political-institutional trust are examined separately; and joined in model 
3. The same procedure is used in model 4 and 5, with the difference that control variables are 
added. In model 6 all variables are included simultaneously and are referred to as ‘full models’. 
The constant, or intercept, in each model is the estimated mean when all independent 
variables are held at zero, and since dichotomous variables are included the constant therefore 
refers to a 15-29 year old, distrusting male with low education. All else held equal, the fixed-
effects coefficients corresponds to the change in the dependent variables following a one-unit 
increase in any of the independent variables. Reported under random-effects are the estimated 
variances around the fixed-effect coefficients for the different variables and countries. 
 
Table 6.1. Multilevel mixed-effects linear regression results for first-order cooperation. 
 
First-order cooperation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Fixed effects – 
Individual level       
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Fixed effects – 
Country level       

















Random effects       







































Log likelihood -49456.538 -49628.703 -49388.633 -44704.617 -44743.349 -44697.211 
AIC 98923.08 99267.41 98791.27 89441.23 89518.7 89430.42 
Chi-bar-squared 
distribution 
2196.96*** 2542.86*** 2331.62*** 1447.14*** 1410.54*** 1449.96*** 
N (country level) 29 29 29 29 29 29 
N (individual level) 31957 31957 31957 31957 31957 31957 
Comment: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses. a: comparison category. 
 
Because of missing data on state capacity, Georgia is unfortunately excluded from the 
upcoming analyses10. The relationship between generalized social trust and first-order 
cooperation are found to be both positive and significant and the first hypothesis is therefore 
supported. The effect size is maintained after the inclusion of political-institutional trust. The 
effect is small, however, and gets even smaller after the inclusion of control variables. In the 
full model, the difference between a trusting and a non-trusting individual is on average about 
0.1 on an outcome variable that ranges from 1 to 5. Random effects ranges from about 0.03 in 
Armenia to 0.2 in Switzerland as can be seen in figure D1 in Appendix D. As hypothesized, 
political-institutional trust does not have an effect on first-order cooperation. Being aware of 
 
10 A separate analysis on Georgia was run, neither social nor political-institutional trust was significant 
predictors of first-order cooperation. Although interesting results in its own, it is decided that separate analyses 
on Georgia will not be included. However, the upcoming exploration of trust-context includes Georgia. 
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the threats facing the environment and having an internal locus of control is found to be strong 
predictors of first-order cooperation. For awareness, moving from the lowest to the highest 
value results in an increase in first-order cooperation of about 1.45, and 1.75 for locus of control. 
Political ideology is negatively correlated to first-order cooperation, meaning that the more 
rightward-leaning an individual are, the lesser inclined they are to cooperate for the 
environment. The difference between the two ideological extremes corresponds to a marginal 
change in the dependent variable of -0.15. Household income is a significant, albeit small, 
factor explaining first-order cooperation; belonging to higher income deciles increase 
individuals’ propensity to cooperate for the environment. Education seems to increase 
individuals cooperative tendencies, but the highest category (doctor and above) is insignificant 
in the full model. The difference between men and women is significant but not of substantial 
value. The same goes for age, being older than 29 years constitute a significant increase in the 
dependent variable, but the effect is small. That so many individual-level variables are 
significant, yet having small effect-sizes, may stem from the fact that large sample-sizes tend 
to decrease p-values. On the country-level state capacity is shown to be an insignificant 
predictor of first-order cooperation. 
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) tests the balance between goodness-of-fit and 
over-fitting the data. It does not say much on its own, but if the AIC is lower compared to 
another model’s AIC it is considered to better fit the data. The AIC is lowest in model 6 and 
accordingly it is the model that best fits the data. 
 
Table 6.2. Multilevel mixed-effects linear regression results for second-order cooperation. 
 
Second-order 
cooperation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Fixed effects – 
Individual level       
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Education: 






















Fixed effects – 
Country level       

















Random effects       




































Log likelihood -48251.705 -48289.18 -48113.118 -47039.868 -46998.817 -46933.155 
AIC 96513.41 96588.36 96240.24 94111.74 94029.63 93902.31 
Chi-bar-squared 
distribution 
2305.27*** 2440.19*** 2550.87*** 1964.78*** 2088.03*** 2110.44*** 
N (country level) 29 29 29 29 29 29 
N (individual level) 31835 31835 31835 31835 31835 31835 
Comment: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses. a: comparison category. 
 
Table 6.2 shows that both generalized social and political-institutional trust are significant 
predictors of second-order cooperation, therefore rendering support for hypothesis two and 
three. The effect of both variables is larger when analysed in isolation, and reduces once 
controls are added. Both coefficients are 0.15 in the full models. However, considering that 
political-institutional trust ranges from 1-4 means that it has a greater impact than social trust 
on the dependent variable. Moving from 1 to 4 corresponds to a change of 0.6 in dependent 
variable, compared to the effect of 0.15 by social trust (since it is dichotomous the coefficient 
directly translates to the effect it has on the dependent variable). A visualization of the random 
effects of social and political-institutional trust are found in Appendix D, figure D2-D3. Worth 
noting is that regardless individuals political-institutional trust in Spain, it will not alter their 
propensity to cooperate in second-order scenarios, whereas the difference between a low-
trusting individual and a high-trusting individual in the Netherlands corresponds to a change in 
the outcome variable of more than 1.2. 
The relationship between the control variables and second-order cooperation show some 
noteworthy differences compared to first-order cooperation. Perhaps most interesting is that 
state capacity not only is significant but that it is also negatively correlated to second-order 
cooperation, contrary to what was expected. Awareness now seems to be a more important 
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factor for second-order cooperation than locus of control, the opposite to what was found in 
table 6.1. In second-order cooperation women are marginally less inclined to cooperate than 
men, and compared to first-order cooperation, being older is now negatively correlated to 
cooperation. 
Political ideology, household income and education behaves the same in second-order as 
in first-order cooperation, with the difference that the highest category of education also is 
significant in the full model, with a coefficient of 0.445. 
The AIC is once again lowest in model 6, making it superior to the other models. 
 
Figure 6.1. Estimated coefficients from first- and second-order cooperation analyses. 
 
Comment: Unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the variable coefficients from first- and second-order cooperation. 
Since these are unstandardized coefficients they cannot be compared to each other without 
taking the different scales on which they are measured into account; see table 4.1 under section 
4.3 for descriptive statistics. That state capacity has large confidence intervals is partly 
explained by the relatively few observations (29) on the country-level. 
 
 
  38 
6.2 Exploration of trust-context 
The second part of the this chapter deals with the exploration of trust-context and how it 
might alter the relationship between trust and first- and second-order cooperation. Aggregated 
social trust scores were calculated to be able to differentiate between low- and high-trust 
countries. Multilevel regressions were performed on subsamples consisting of the five most 
(Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden and Iceland), as well as least (Albania, Georgia, Romania, 
Croatia and Bulgaria) trusting countries. State capacity is excluded since there are too few 
observations on the country-level. Results are presented in table 6.3 and 6.4. Although control 
variables reveal interesting findings, this section primarily focuses on the role of trust. 
 
Table 6.3. First-order cooperation in high- and low-trusting countries. 
First-order cooperation High 1 High 2 High 3 Low 1 Low 2 Low 3 
Fixed effects – Individual 
level 
      















Awareness   .229*** (.012)   
.308*** 
(.013) 
Locus of control   .387*** (.011)   
.243*** 
(.013) 
Political ideology   -.020*** (.005)   
-0.15** 
(.005) 




medium-lowa   
.275*** 




medium-higha   
.230*** 




higha   
.141 
(.113)   
-.389 
(.238) 
Femalea   .105*** (.023)   
-.060* 
(.030) 
Age 30-49a   .152*** (.037)   
-.034 
(.044) 
Age 50 and abovea   .139*** (.034)   
-.007 
(.042) 













Random effects       







































Log likelihood -11191.68 -11224.57 -10124.03 -7471.355 -7468.317 -6902.191 
AIC 22393.37 22459.15 20282.05 14952.71 14946.63 13838.38 
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Chi-bar-squared distribution 129.75*** 110.28*** 113.26*** 587.37*** 524.57*** 461.93*** 
N (country level) 5 5 5 5 5 5 
N (individual level) 7298 7298 7298 4759 4759 4759 
 
Comment: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses. a: comparison category. 
 
Model ‘high 1’ and ‘high 2’ shows both social trust and political-institutional trust to be 
significant and positive predictors of first-order cooperation in high-trusting countries. While 
still significant, their coefficients decreases when both are included with controls in model ‘high 
3’. Contrary to what was hypothesized, political-institutional trust show a positive and 
significant relationship with first-order cooperation in high-trust countries. Thus, both social 
trust and political-institutional trust help to explain first-order cooperation in high-trusting 
countries. 
When social trust is analysed in isolation in ‘low 1’ it is positively correlated to 
cooperation, but insignificant in the full model. Political-institutional trust are negatively 
correlated to cooperation in low-trusting countries but the relationship turns insignificant in the 
full model. According to the full model, in low-trusting countries neither social trust nor 
political-institutional trust help to explain first-order cooperation. 
 
Table 6.4. Second-order cooperation in high- and low-trusting countries. 
Second-order cooperation High 4 High 5 High 6 Low 4 Low 5 Low 6 
Fixed effects – Individual 
level       





(.070)  .132 (.073) 
Pol.-inst. trust  .259*** (.031) 
.192*** 
(.026)  .027 (.043) .046 (.039) 
Awareness   .253*** (.012)   
.108*** 
(.013) 
Locus of control   .049*** (.012)   
.062*** 
(.012) 
Political ideology   -.064*** (.006)   .007 (.005) 
Income   -.001 (.005)   .009 (.006) 
Education: 
medium-lowa   
-.044 








higha   
.366** 
(.117)   .351 (.223) 
Femalea   -.108*** (.024)   
-.027 
(.029) 
Age 30-49a   -.159*** (.039)   .042 (.041) 
Age 50 and abovea   -.129*** (.035)   .052 (.040) 
Fixed effects – Country 
level       













Random effects       
Social trust (var) 7.9e-14 
(8.4e-11)  
1.9e-18 
(-) .013 (.018)  .016 (.018) 
Pol.-inst. trust (var)  .001 (.003) 6.9e-16 (-)  .006 (.006) .005 (.005) 
Constant (var) .056 (.036) .064 (.051) .047 (-) .139 (.088) .135 (.092) .133 (.090) 





(-) .962 (.020) .965 (.020) .930 (.019) 
Log likelihood -10828.31 -10826.26 -10347.59 -6665.77 -6672.839 -6588.108 
AIC 21666.61 21662.52 20721.18 13341.53 13355.68 13210.22 
Chi-bar-squared 
distribution 
251.70*** 255.88*** 240.38*** 571.04*** 551.72*** 511.88*** 
N (country level) 5 5 5 5 5 5 
N (individual level) 7286 7286 7286 4752 4752 4752 
 
Comment: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses. a: comparison category. 
 
Both generalized social trust and political-institutional trust significantly predicts second-
order cooperation in high-trust countries. In line with previous results the coefficients are 
reduced after the inclusion of control variables in ‘high 6’, but still significant. The coefficient 
of social trust, 0.065, indicates that there are barely no difference between a trusting and a 
distrusting individual in high-trusting countries when it comes to second-order cooperation. 
Social trust is significant in ‘low 4’ but turns insignificant in the full model, ‘low 6’. Political-
institutional trust is insignificant in both ‘low 5’ and ‘low 6’. Thus, both aspects of trust show 
no relationship with second-order cooperation in low-trust countries. 
To sum up the analysis on trust-context, generalized social trust and political-institutional 
trust seems to be a facilitator of both first- and second-order cooperation in high-trust countries, 





It was hypothesized for social trust to be positively linked to both first- and second-order 
cooperation, and that political-institutional trust only are linked to second-order cooperation. 
For first-order cooperation political-institutional trust were hypothesized to have no 
relationship. Based on the main investigation all hypotheses were supported. People trusting 
other people in general – all else held equal - seems more likely to engage in collective action 
and to cooperate for the environment, regardless the action of others. People who have 
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confidence in the political-institutional system seems more inclined to contribute in second-
order cooperation situations. 
However, the effect of social trust on cooperation is small, the difference between a 
trusting individual and a non-trusting individual is on average next to negligible. Even in 
countries where generalized social trust has its greatest effect it only amounts to an increase of 
0.2 steps on a five-step dependent variable. Using a social trust index instead results in average 
effects of .16 for first-order and .22 for second-order cooperation, so the effect is clearly larger, 
especially when considering that it ranges from 1-411. But it should be noted that the index 
agrees more with a ‘particularistic’ form of trust. The correlation between the two 
measurements are 0.49, indicating a rather low correlation considering that they ought to 
measure the same underlying phenomena. Both measurements obviously has to do with trust in 
other people, even if they do not agree fully on a theoretical level. But it also raises questions 
as to how much of the results are driven by the fact that one measurement is dichotomous and 
the other continuous. In many datasets frequently used in empirical research, the item asking 
respondents about their trust in other people often use a continuous scale of 1-5 or 0-10. Perhaps 
the strong link between social trust and cooperation found in previous research is driven, in 
part, by the fact that a trust-scale with many steps might result in an exaggeration of the 
correlation between trust and cooperation. It is of course possible to have ‘more’ or ‘less’ trust 
in other people, but complications arise when subjective perceptions are quantified in order for 
them to be compared. It was discussed previously that the meaning of ‘people in general’ are 
associated with uncertainties as to what it actually is referring to. An issue to consider is the 
possibility that the meaning of trust might differ between countries. That is, do a high-trusting 
individual in Albania trust ‘other people in general’ to the same extent as a high-trusting 
individual in Sweden does? Put differently, is the scale equal across countries? There are no 
problems to technically differentiate between low- and high-trusting individuals within 
countries, but the question is whether they are comparable between countries from a substantial 
perspective. 
Political-institutional trust are linked only to second-order cooperation. This is intuitive 
because without confidence in the political-institutional system’s capacity to efficiently manage 
the task they are set to handle there is little point in funding such activities. The supported 
hypothesis that political-institutional trust do not have an effect on first-order cooperation is at 
first glance also intuitive. Why would one’s trust in the political-institutional system affect 
 
11 See Appendix D: figure D4-D5 for random effects of the social trust index. 
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one’s propensity to voluntarily cooperate for the environment? The political-institutional 
system obviously plays a role in creating opportunities for individual cooperation, but that 
rather has to do with the capacity, or quality, of said institutions than individuals’ confidence 
in them. However, if political-institutional trust has a causal impact on generalized social trust, 
as was discussed above, then it would be premature to conclude that it does not have an impact 
on first-order cooperation. 
A strength with these findings is that the measurements used for operationalizing first- 
and second-order cooperation agrees well to the logic of collective action, especially the item 
used for first-order cooperation. Most of the previous empirical research ‘proxy’ collective 
action with items asking about recycling habits (Harring et al., 2019; Sønderskov, 2009) or self-
reported organic food consumption (Jagers & Robertson, 2018), in the present study the first-
order item touches upon the core of the dilemma by asking whether individuals are willing to 
cooperate for the environment regardless the action taken by others. The item measuring 
second-order cooperation, however, is not necessarily an example of an enforced situation. To 
some extent it measures individuals’ willingness to abide by such enforcement were they to be 
implemented. After all, the exact wording could lead them to think of it as a ‘green tax’ since 
it is stated “I would give parts of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to 
prevent environmental pollution”. Even if it could imply a voluntary donation to a ‘green fund’, 
they ultimately put their trust in the institutions implemented to mitigate pollution. That fund 
might in turn use the funds to accumulate emission allowances in order to reduce pollution, a 
system managed by the political-institutional system. Also, the word ‘certain’ should make the 
question contingent upon individuals’ trust-levels. Since it is implied that the money will safely 
end up where intended, it should amount to whether respondents trust and have confidence in 
the political-institutional system to responsibly and efficiently manage their contributions. 
By exploring the hypotheses in high- and low-trusting countries some interesting results 
emerge. Social trust is now linked to first-order cooperation only in high-trusting countries. But 
it should be noted that the effect-size of trust is lower compared to the whole sample. Both 
social and political-institutional trust are still predicting second-order cooperation in high-trust 
countries. Moreover, in high-trust countries even political-institutional trust is a significant 
factor for first-order cooperation. Regardless the action taken by others, individuals trusting 
politicians and institutions are more inclined to cooperate for the environment, in high-trust 
countries. A possible explanation could be that those individuals trust that the state are capable 
of successfully encouraging free-riders into cooperation, so that their own contributions become 
meaningful. Returning once again to the debate on causality; it could also give some support 
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for the theory that the high-quality institutions found in these countries make people inclined 
to trust said institutions which also has the spill-over effect of generating social trust (Rothstein 
& Stolle, 2008), thus resulting in both social and political-institutional trust to be significant. 
The same reasoning might hold for low-trust countries, where neither social nor political-
institutional trust significantly predicts any form of cooperation. The poor quality of the 
institutions in these countries are unable to generate sufficient levels of trust for it to be a useful 
predictor of cooperation. That political-institutional trust was significant and negatively 
correlated to first-order cooperation in ‘low 2’ but not in ‘low 3’, when controls were added, 
hints that the relationship was spurious in ‘low 2’. 
The exploration on trust-context goes in line with previous findings showing that 
individual-level trust only has a relationship with cooperation in societies where trust is high 
(Irwin & Berigan, 2013), as well as findings showing that the effect of trust on support for 
environmental protection varies across countries (Fairbrother, 2016). As such, the results also 
addresses the inquiry raised by Jagers and Robertson (2018) whether the relationship between 
trust and cooperation might differ in countries where generalized trust levels are lower. 
Moreover, the relative effect of individual-level trust in high-trust countries is small. By the 
look of it, it certainly seems that the role of trust in facilitating cooperation are dependent upon 
context. 
The operationalizing of trust-context might leave much to be desired, however. Taking 
the five most and least trusting countries resulted in two samples that differ on many aspects 
other than just trust. All high-trust countries are Nordic countries where economic development 
is high and institutions impartial whereas the low-trust sample are characterized by low 
economic development and bureaucracies stifled by corruption, and so on. 
Awareness and locus of control consistently have strong and substantial effects on 
cooperation throughout the models. In second-order cooperation, being aware of the threats 
facing the environment is comparatively more important than feeling that it is within one’s 
capacity to do anything about it. That seems reasonable considering that in giving parts of one’s 
income, that person leaves it to someone else to do the job and, vice versa, in first-order 
cooperation locus of control plays the relatively more prominent role of the two. In these 
situations it is not surprising that the more people feel that they themselves are able to actually 
influence the outcome, the more inclined they are to contribute, especially considering that first-
order cooperation typically relies on individual direct action. 
Perhaps this is part of an explanation as to why prospects for environmental cooperation 
seems to be so good even in countries where distrust is widespread. In Serbia and Armenia, for 
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example, over half of the respondents disagree to the statement that there is no point to do what 
they can for the environment unless others do the same, and that in countries where more than 
three quarters of respondents think that you cannot be too careful when dealing with other 
people. Even if individuals do not trust other people and the risk that the good might be 
insufficiently produced is imminent, they are willing to cooperate for the environment out of 
personal beliefs or convictions, or the saliency of the issue. On a side note, it should not be 
forgotten that environmental concern is not a necessary prerequisite for cooperation – economic 
incentives and cultural values, for example, also help in shaping pro-environmental behaviours 
(Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). 
Previous literature has mainly focused on disentangling the concept of generalized social 
trust. Not much attention are given to what it means being a ‘non-trusting’ individual. Cook, 
Hardin and Levi (2005) differentiate between distrust as an active and a passive state, arguing 
that having a lack of trust is a passive state and are not to be confused with the problematic 
active state of distrust. It is therefore possible that in countries where people generally do not 
trust each other they are fully capable of cooperating because their lack of trust is of a passive 
character. 
As for the other included factors they mostly behave as expected. Being left-leaning, more 
educated and having a relatively higher income are all linked to more positive attitudes towards 
environmental cooperation. But the effect of income, and thus the support for any affluence or 
post-materialist hypothesis, is weak. When accounting for trust-context, income is only 
significant in first-order cooperation in low-trust countries. However, closely related to income 
is the level of education, where higher education often yield higher incomes. It is therefore 
possible that income is partially expressed through education and it could thus be an explanation 
as to why education is significant in models when income is not, and vice versa. After all, the 
mean income (deciles) for the highly educated group is 7.4 and 3.2 for the baseline category of 
low education. Education has many facets, and apart from the income aspect, highly educated 
individuals might also have larger amounts of social and cultural capital, making them more 
likely to understand the present dilemma and the capacity to act upon it. Age and sex show 
some peculiar results. Being female and of older age is positively linked to first-order 
cooperation but negatively linked to second-order cooperation. All else equal, women and 
relatively older people seems to be somewhat more open to forms of cooperation that typically 
involves behavioural change, whereas men and younger people on average are more willing to 
pay for environmental solutions. It is difficult to know what these differences stem from, even 
more so when it seems to be true only in high-trust countries. Perhaps not too surprising, 
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however, since meta-analyses show both age and sex to exhibit mixed links to pro-
environmental behaviours in general (Hines et al., 1987). 
State capacity is negatively correlated to second-order cooperation and thus contrary to 
what was hypothesized. Meaning that in countries where institutions are impartial and rule of 
law is norm people are actually less inclined to give parts of their income to tackle 
environmental degradation. As counterintuitive as it may seem, there are some plausible 
explanations. People who are living in countries where the state is functioning well might feel 
that the environment is best taken care of the institutions already in place, rendering one’s own 
contributions unnecessary. In countries where the state barely functions, people might think 
that it is up to they themselves to contribute for the environment since government are incapable 
of doing it. 
Perhaps the most obvious limitation to the study is that the dependent variables only 
measure intentions, or attitudes, toward cooperation, and not actual behaviour. However, 
intentions and attitudes might be a good way of ‘proxying’ actual behaviour since self-reported 
behaviour are more heavily biased through social desirability and memory lapses (Duit, 2010; 
Sønderskov, 2009). With this in mind it is probably wise not to directly translate these findings 
into actual cooperation, but rather the willingness among individuals to cooperate for the 
environment. 
Underlying this study is the assumption that individuals are conditional co-operators 
(Sønderskov, 2009), that is, individuals cooperate if other people cooperate. The present data 
does unfortunately not offer any explanations as to the reasoning behind their intentions, so the 
actual mechanism linking trust to cooperation are not investigated. But the theoretical links 
between trust and cooperation in social dilemmas are well proven so it is quite plausible that a 
variant of that mechanism is what links them together. Thus, what is measured is the direct 
effect of trust on individuals’ willingness to cooperate. 
Finally, it was shown that there potentially are some heteroskedasticity present in the 
models which might cause some relationships to be stronger than they actually are. But, 
considering that most significant results are significant at the 0.001 level should indicate that 
they probably would hold for the larger standard errors following from evenly distributed error 
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8. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis has been to deepen our knowledge regarding trust and its ability 
to facilitate cooperation for the environment in large-scale collective action dilemmas. More 
specifically, both generalized social trust and political-institutional trust were examined in order 
to distinguish their separate roles in first- and second-order cooperation; with the further 
possibility that the link between trust and cooperation might vary across trust-contexts. As such, 
this thesis adds to ongoing research on how factors proven benevolent in small-scale collective 
action fare when the size of the dilemma scales up. 
The results tells us that generalized social trust is a significant facilitator of both first- and 
second order cooperation when the whole sample is analysed, and political-institutional trust 
are only linked to second-order cooperation. Thus, all hypotheses were supported, and to relate 
to the overarching research question, it seems as if both aspects of trust positively influences 
individuals propensity to engage in collective action for the environment. The results are in line 
with previous findings linking trust to cooperation (e.g. Irwin, 2019). However, when trust-
context is explored it turns out that these findings only hold for countries with high levels of 
generalized social trust. While it is still possible for cooperation to occur in low-trust countries, 
individual levels of generalized social and political-institutional trust seems not to be a crucial 
prerequisite for that to happen. This brings about some implications for the role of trust in large-
scale collective action, as it seems that individual levels of trust is next to irrelevant if 
individuals are living in contexts where most people do not trust each other. Moreover, this 
study has also shown that the effect of trust in fostering cooperation differ substantially across 
countries. As such, the strength of this thesis is its empirical contribution. 
While the present study only serves to explore trust-context, further research should focus 
both theoretically and empirically on the interplay between trust as a societal feature and trust 
at an individual level. Due to the relatively small effect that trust had on cooperation in high-
trust countries, perhaps individual levels of trust is simply not that relevant for cooperation in 
contexts where trust is high? The risks associated with cooperation might be perceived as lower 
in such contexts since individuals can assume most other people will cooperate anyways, and 
therefore their own outlook on the trustworthiness of others is of less importance. Similarly, a 
high-trusting individual in a low-trust context might be impelled to abstain cooperation since 
free-riding behaviour is widespread and the risk of being the sucker is evident. This actualises 
an even larger question. Due to the scale of most environmental problems, often spanning the 
whole world, there is a possibility that even in countries where trust is high, people will not 
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choose to cooperate since they know that for most parts of the world, trust is low. Even if 
individuals trust people in general and are nested in contexts with like-minded people, they 
might conclude that the best strategy still is to refrain from cooperation since they do not want 
to end up being suckers because of the imminent risk that less trusting people on the other side 
of the world will free-ride on their contributions. 
What are the prospects for mitigating environmental threats such as climate change 
through the use of trust? Policy measures intended to increase environmental cooperation and 
compliance in low-trust countries might prove futile if they are to rely on generalized trust as 
the sole mechanism, whereas it might be a fruitful way to go in countries where societal trust 
levels are high. Because of its alleged benevolent effects on generating both political-
institutional and social trust, measures should probably first be directed at increasing the quality 
of institutions, if social trust are to be a facilitator of environmental cooperation regardless the 
context. Luckily, however, individuals seem willing to cooperate for the environment even if 
they do not trust others to cooperate, as some of the other investigated factors show; especially 
being aware of the threats facing our environment and believing in one’s own capacity to affect 
the outcome. 
In conclusion, trust seems to be a facilitator of environmental collective action in some 
contexts, but the impact of trust varies and is contingent upon what kind of cooperation it 
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10. APPENDIXES 
Appendix A. Participating countries 
Country n Country n Country n 
Albania 1435 Finland 1199 Norway 1123 
Azerbaijan 1800 France 1870 Poland 1352 
Austria 1644 Georgia 2194 Romania 1613 
Armenia 1500 Germany 5407 Russia 1825 
Bulgaria 1560 Great Britain 1788 Serbia 1500 
Belarus 1548 Hungary 1516 Slovak Rep. 1435 
Croatia 1488 Iceland 2506 Slovenia 1076 
Czech Rep. 1812 Italy 2277 Spain 1211 
Denmark 3362 Lithuania 1448 Sweden 1194 
Estonia 1304 Netherlands 2721 Switzerland 3660 
 
Appendix B. Diagnostics 
Table B1. Variance inflation factor 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
State capacity 1.29 0.774261 
Social trust 1.27 0.785743 
Locus of control 1.19 0.842848 
Awareness 1.18 0.844421 
Education 1.18 0.849262 
Income 1.18 0.850831 
Political-institutional trust 1.15 0.872142 
Political ideology 1.04 0.959560 
Age 1.03 0.973445 
Sex 1.02 0.979419 
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Figure B1. Distribution of residuals - first-order cooperation. 
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Figure B3. Q-norm plot: residuals - first-order cooperation. 
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Figure B5. Q-norm plot: predicted values - first-order cooperation. 
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Figure B7. Cook’s D – first-order cooperation. 
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Appendix C. Robustness tests 
Table C1. First- and second-order cooperation using multilevel mixed-effects ordered 
logistic regression. 







Fixed effects – Individual 
level 
    
















Awareness  .600*** (.011)  
.384*** 
(.011) 
Locus of control  .732*** (.011)  
.119*** 
(.010) 
Political ideology  -.029*** (.005)  
-.051*** 
(.005) 





















Femalea  .067** (.021)  
-.098*** 
(.021) 
Age 30-49a  .096** (.033)  
-.269*** 
(.033) 
Age 50 and abovea  .094** (.031)  
-.243*** 
(.031) 
Fixed effects – Country 
level     
State capacity  -.105 (.463)  
-1.758** 
(.621) 
































Random effects     
























Log likelihood -45266.336 -40138.388 -45754.477 -44439.792 
AIC 90550.67 80316.78 91526.95 88919.58 
Chi-bar-squared 
distribution 
2409.69*** 1426.59*** 2650.21*** 2214.27*** 
N (country level) 29 29 29 29 
N (individual level) 31957 31957 31835 31835 
Comment: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses. a: comparison category. 
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Table C2. First- and second-order cooperation using a continuous social trust index 
instead of a dichotomous operationalisation. 
 







Fixed effects – Individual 
level 
    








Pol.-inst. trust  -.001 (.016)  
.138*** 
(.019) 
Awareness  .286*** (.006)  
.201*** 
(.006) 
Locus of control  .347*** (.005)  
.053*** 
(.006) 
Political ideology  -.015*** (.003)  
-.028*** 
(.003) 





















Femalea  .038** (.011)  
-.060*** 
(.012) 
Age 30-49a  .049** (.018)  
-.149*** 
(.019) 
Age 50 and abovea  .025 (.017)  
-.154*** 
(.018) 
Fixed effects – Country 
level     











Random effects     








Pol.-inst. trust (var)  .003 (.002)  
.006 
(.003) 
















Log likelihood -46315.297 -41920.52 -45165.696 -43957.997 
AIC 92640.59 83877.04 90341.39 87951.99 
Chi-bar-squared 
distribution 
1896.29*** 1308.05*** 2221.88*** 1909.52*** 
N (country level) 29 29 29 29 
N (individual level) 30024 30024 29926 29926 
Comment: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses. a: comparison category. 
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Table C3. Multilevel regression: full models with GDP/Capita, and GDP/Capita plus 
state capacity, included. 
 







Fixed effects – Individual 
level     






































































































Fixed effects – Country 
level     
State capacity  .072 (.636)  
.315 
(.854) 
















Random effects     
































Log likelihood -44697.194 -44697.188 -46931.902 -46931.834 
AIC 89430.39 89432.38 93899.8 93901.67 
Chi-bar-squared 
distribution 
1453.10*** 1439.81*** 1981.73*** 1979.55*** 
N (country level) 29 29 29 29 
N (individual level) 31957 31957 31835 31835 
Comment: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses. a: comparison category. 
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Appendix D. Visualizations of random effects 
Figure D1. Random effects of social trust on first-order cooperation. 
 
Figure D2. Random effects of social trust on second-order cooperation. 
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Figure D3. Random effects of political-institutional trust on second-order cooperation. 
 
 
Figure D4. Random effects of social trust index on first-order cooperation. 
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Figure D5. Random effects of social trust index on second-order cooperation. 
 
